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Abstract 
The Human Error Template (HET) is a recently developed methodology for 
predicting designed induced pilot error. This article describes a validation study 
undertaken to compare the performance of HET against three contemporary Human 
Error Identification (HEI) approaches when used to predict pilot errors for an 
approach and landing task and also to compare individual analyst error predictions to 
an approach to enhancing error prediction sensitivity: the multiple analysts and 
methods approach, whereby multiple analyst predictions using a range of HEI 
technique are pooled. The findings indicate that, of the four methodologies used in 
isolation, analysts using the HET methodology offered the most accurate error 
predictions, and also that the multiple analysts and methods approach was more 
successful overall in terms of error prediction sensitivity than the three other methods 
but not the HET approach. The results suggest that when predicting design induced 
error, it is appropriate to use domain specific approaches and also a toolkit of different 
HEI approaches and multiple analysts in order to heighten error prediction sensitivity. 
Keywords: Human error, Human Error Identification, Error Prediction, Reliability & Validity. 
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Introduction to Human Error Identification   
Human error remains a problem of great concern to human factor’s professionals and 
within complex sociotechnical systems around 75% of all accidents and safety 
compromising incidents are attributed to human error. There are many means of 
reducing or mitigating human error and one approach involves the use of structured 
methodologies to predict the errors that are likely to be made by operators during task 
performance. Human Error Identification (HEI) works on the premise that an 
understanding of an employee’s work task and the characteristics of the technology 
being used allows analysts to predict, a priori, potential errors that may arise from the 
resulting interaction (Baber & Stanton, 1996, Stanton & Baber, 2002). The use of HEI 
techniques is now widespread, with applications in a wide range of domains including 
the nuclear power and petro-chemical processing industries (Kirwan, 1996), air traffic 
control (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002), aviation (Harris, Stanton, Marshall, Demagalski, 
Young & Salmon, 2005), naval space operations (Nelson et al, 1998), medicine and 
public technology (Baber & Stanton, 1996). 
 
Despite the superfluity of HEI techniques available (a methods review identified over 
50 approaches – see Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber & Jenkins, 2005) and their 
increased application, they are relatively rarely used in the domain of the civil flight 
deck. This is surprising since it has previously been established that the major cause 
of aviation accidents is human error (McFadden and Towell, 1999). Estimates vary, 
but data suggest that human error has been identified as a causal or contributory factor 
in as many as 75% of the accidents that occur in commercial aviation (Civil Aviation 
Authority, 1998). Further, a number of high profile aviation incidents have been 
attributed, at least in some part, to design-induced human error, including the Nagoya 
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Airbus A300-600 accident (where the pilots could not disengage the go-around mode 
after inadvertent activation due to a lack of understanding of the automation and poor 
design of the operating logic in the autoland system), the Cali Boeing 757 accident 
(where the poor interface design of the flight management computer and a lack of 
logic checking led to a controlled flight into terrain accident) and the Strasbourg A320 
accident at Mont St Odile (where the crew inadvertently set an excessive descent rate 
instead of manipulating the flight path angle as a result of both functions using a 
common control interface and an associated poorly designed display). 
 
As part of a DTI/EUREKA! funded project entitled, “Prediction of Human Errors on 
Civil Flightdecks”, the authors developed a new HEI methodology designed to be 
used specifically for predicting design induced pilot error on civil flight decks. The 
Human Error Template (HET; Marshall et al, 2003) was developed specifically for 
use in the certification of civil flight deck technology. The impetus for this came from 
a US Federal Aviation Administration report (FAA, 1996), which identified many 
major deficiencies in the design process of modern commercial airliner flight decks. 
In particular, the recommendations within the report made explicit the requirement for 
flight deck designs to be evaluated for their susceptibility to design-induced 
flightcrew errors and also to identify the likely consequences of those errors during 
the type certification process (Harris et al, 2005).  
 
As safety-critical systems become more and more complex, the use of HEI is an 
important feature of system design and analysis that can contribute to the 
enhancement of system safety. Accurate error prediction allows systemic flaws to be 
removed from system designs and from already existing systems. Valid approaches 
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for predicting errors in safety-critical systems, as well as procedures that potentially 
could enhance the accuracy of HEI efforts are therefore an important provision. The 
aims of this study were two fold. Firstly, we wished to assess the performance of the 
HET methodology against three contemporary HEI methods, SHERPA (Embrey 
1986), Human Error HAZOP and the Human Error Identification in Systems Tool 
(HEIST; Kirwan 1994). The purpose of this was to validate the HET methodology as 
a tool for predicting design induced pilot error on civil flightdecks.  It was anticipated 
that the HET methodology would be more accurate at predicting design induced pilot 
error than the three contemporary methods. This assumption was based upon the fact 
that the HET methodology was developed specifically use on flightdecks. This meant 
that its error mode taxonomy was tailored especially for use on civil flightdecks, 
whereas the other three methods were developed for control room and nuclear power 
plant tasks, and so their EEM taxonomies were not domain specific. Secondly, we 
wished to compare the performance of an approach designed to enhance the accuracy 
of error predictions, namely the multiple methods and multiple analysts approach, in 
which the error predictions of different analysts using different methods are pooled in 
order to enhance error prediction sensitivity.  
 
The Human Error Template 
The HET methodology uses an aviation specific external error mode (EEM) 
taxonomy that was developed from a review of existing HEI methods and an 
evaluation of incidences of design-induced pilot error. The HET EEM taxonomy 
comprises the following 12 error types: 
• Fail to execute e.g. pilot fails to perform a particular task or action. 
• Task execution incomplete e.g. pilot fails to perform a task or action in its entirety. 
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• Task executed in the wrong direction e.g. pilot turns a knob or moves a lever in 
the wrong direction. 
• Wrong task executed e.g. pilot performs a wrong task or action. 
• Task repeated e.g. pilot presses the correct button twice. 
• Task executed on the wrong interface element e.g. pilot presses the wrong button. 
• Task executed too early e.g. pilot performs a task or action too early in a sequence.  
• Task executed too late e.g. pilot performs a task or action too late in a sequence 
• Task executed too much e.g. pilot moves a lever or turns a knob too much. 
• Task executed too little e.g. pilot does not move a lever or turns a knob 
sufficiently. 
• Misread Information e.g. pilot misreads the information presented by a display.  
• Other. 
 
The HET EEM taxonomy is applied to each bottom level task step in a Hierarchical 
Task Analysis (HTA; Stanton, 2006) of the flight task under analysis in order to 
identify any credible errors. The identification of credible errors is based on the 
analyst’s subjective judgement and involves the analyst either observing the task 
being performed or walking through the task themselves either with the flight deck 
interface itself or with functional drawings and photographs of the interface. For each 
credible error (i.e. those judged by the analyst to be possible) the analyst provides a 
description of the form that the error would take, such as, ‘pilot dials in the airspeed 
value using the heading knob’ or ‘pilot fails to lower the landing gear’. Next, the 
outcome or consequence associated with the error is described (e.g. the consequence 
of the pilot dialling in the airspeed using the heading knob would be that the aircraft 
inappropriately adjusts its heading to that of the erroneously entered speed value). 
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Finally, judgements on the likelihood of the error occurring (Low, Medium or High) 
and the criticality of the error (Low, Medium or High) are made based on domain 
expertise and experience. If the identified error is given a ‘high’ rating for both 
likelihood and criticality, the interface technology in question is rated as a ‘fail’, 
meaning that it is not suitable for certification. An example HET pro-forma for the 
task step ‘Dial the speed/mach knob to enter 150 on the IAS/Mach display’ is 
presented in Table 1.  A flowchart depicting the HET procedure is presented in Figure 
1. 
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Table 1. Example HET output (Source: Marshall et al, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. HET Flowchart 
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Validating the Human Error Template 
The validity of HEI techniques requires testing to ensure that they are accurate in the 
prediction of error, whilst the reliability of HEI techniques requires testing to ensure 
that the techniques offer the same error predictions when used by different analysts 
for the same task and when used by the same analyst more than once for the same 
task. Typically, HEI techniques place a great amount of dependence upon the 
judgement of the analyst and so different analysts may make different predictions 
regarding the same problem (inter-analyst reliability). Similarly, the same analyst 
may make different judgments on different occasions (intra-analyst reliability).  
 
A number of HEI technique validation studies have been reported in the literature 
(e.g. Williams, 1989; Whalley and Kirwan, 1989; Kirwan, 1992a; 1992b; 1998a; 
1998b, Kennedy, 1995; Baber and Stanton, 1996, Stanton and Stevenage, 1998). For 
example, Whalley and Kirwan (1989) evaluated six HEI methods for their ability to 
accurately predict the errors responsible for four incidents that had previously 
occurred in the nuclear industry. Similarly, Kennedy (1995) examined the ability of a 
number of HEI methods to predict the errors attributed as causal factors in ten major 
disasters. In conclusion to an evaluation of 12 HEI approaches, Kirwan (1992b) 
recommended a combination of expert judgement and the Systematic Human Error 
Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA; Embrey, 1986) as the most valid 
approach to HEI. Baber and Stanton (1996) tested the validity of SHERPA and Task 
Analysis For Error Identification (TAFEI; Baber and Stanton, 1996) when used to 
predict London Underground rail ticket machine errors. It was concluded that both 
SHERPA and TAFEI provided an acceptable level of validity based upon the data 
from two expert analysts. Stanton and Stevenage (1998) also tested the validity of 
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SHERPA and a heuristic approach when used to predict error on a vending machine 
task. It was concluded that SHERPA provided a better means of predicting errors than 
the heuristic approach did. Moreover, it was reported that SHERPA returned a mean 
sensitivity index (SI) of 0.76 at trial one; 0.74 at trial two; and 0.73 at trial three, 
which represent very acceptable levels of validity. 
 
Multiple Methods and Analysts  
It is apparent from the validation studies described above that, although achieving 
acceptable levels of validity (e.g. SHERPA studies typically return sensitivity index 
scores of around 0.7) there is room for improvement in terms of the accuracy of HEI 
error predictions. One such approach could be to use a combination of multiple 
methods and multiple analysts based on the notion that the accuracy of error 
predictions may be enhanced by using a range of different but complementary HEI 
approaches to predict human errors for the same task and also that pooling the error 
predictions made by a number of different analysts could also enhance the 
comprehensiveness of the errors predicted.  The underlying assumption is that the 
shortfalls of each HEI technique and each analyst are compensated for by the other 
techniques and analysts used (i.e. any errors that method A misses, method B will 
highlight, and any errors that analyst A misses, analyst B may highlight, and so on) 
which should enhance error prediction sensitivity and accuracy. Kirwan (1998a, b) 
first proposed the concept of using a range or ‘toolkit’ of HEI methods to enhance 
error prediction sensitivity in complex systems. In conclusion to a review of 38 
existing HRA/HEI techniques Kirwan (1998a) reported that, since none of the 
techniques available satisfied all of the 14 criteria against which they were evaluated, 
a framework or toolkit approach may be the most suitable approach for enhancing the 
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comprehensiveness of the HEI analysis. Kirwan (1998b) suggested that practitioners 
to utilise a framework type approach to HEI, whereby a mixture of independent 
HRA/HEI tools would be used under one framework. One possible framework 
proposed by Kirwan (1998b) comprised SHERPA, the Human Error Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP), Errors Of Commission Analysis (EOCA; Kirwan, 
1994), Confusion matrix analyses, Fault symptom matrix analysis and the Skill, Rule 
and Knowledge-based behaviour approach.  
 
Although due to its novelty there appears to be nothing within the academic literature 
stating the strengths and weaknesses of multiple methods and analysts approaches to 
HEI, it is apparent that, whilst potentially improving error prediction sensitivity, 
multiple methods and analysts approaches do have some potential weaknesses.  
Firstly, the false alarm rate (i.e. errors predicted that do not in fact occur) can 
potentially be increased due to the pooled error data. However, in safety critical 
industries it may be acceptable to generate a high rate of false alarms in order to 
ensure that all potential errors are identified. Secondly, the use of additional methods 
can significantly increase the level of resources (e.g. time, training etc) required to 
undertake HEI analyses and also the increased data returned will ultimately increase 
the time required for data analysis. 
 
The three methods, SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST were chosen as a 
result of a literature review of 32 existing HEI methods from which it was concluded 
that the SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST methodologies were the most 
suited for use in the prediction of potential design induced error on the flightdeck. A 
brief description of the three techniques is provided in the following sections. For a 
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more exhaustive description of the latter three techniques, including example outputs, 
the reader is referred to Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber & Jenkins (2005). 
 
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) 
SHERPA (Embrey, 1986) was originally developed for use in the nuclear 
reprocessing industry and is probably the most commonly used HEI approach, with 
applications in a number of domains, including ticket machines (Baber & Stanton, 
1996), vending machines (Stanton and Stevenage, 1998), and in-car radio-cassette 
machines (Stanton & Young, 1999). SHERPA uses a behavioural taxonomy linked to 
an error mode taxonomy and is applied to a HTA of the task under analysis. The 
behavioural and EEM taxonomies are used to identify credible errors that are likely to 
occur during each step in the HTA. For each credible error identified the analyst 
provides a description of the form that the error would take, such as, ‘pilot dials in 
wrong airspeed’ and identifies any consequences associated with the error and also 
any recovery steps that would need to be taken in event of the error being made. 
Finally, ordinal probability (Low, Medium or High), criticality (Low, Medium or 
High) and potential design remedies are recorded.  
 
Human Error Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
HAZOP (Kletz, 1974; cited in Swann & Preston, 1995) is a well-established 
engineering approach that was developed in the late 1960s by ICI (Swann and 
Preston, 1995) for use in process design audit and engineering risk assessment 
(Kirwan, 1992a). Typically undertaken as a group approach, HAZOP involves 
analysts applying guidewords, such as Not done, More than or Later than, to each 
task step in order to identify potential errors that may occur.  Many variations on the 
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HAZOP approach exist, and the Human Error HAZOP approach was developed for 
dealing with human error issues (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). In the present study, 
a set of Human Error HAZOP guidewords (Whalley, 1988; cited in Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992) were used. Each guideword is applied to each task step to identify 
any credible errors. Once a description of the error is provided, the consequences, 
cause and recovery path of the error are described. Finally, redesign suggestions are 
made to either prevent the error from occurring or mitigate its consequences. 
  
Human Error Identification in Systems Tool (HEIST) 
The HEIST technique (Kirwan, 1994) is a component of the HERA methodology 
(Kirwan, 1998b) and uses error identifier questions (e.g. “Could the operator fail to 
carry out the act in time?”) linked to behaviour tables and an external error mode 
taxonomy that are designed to prompt the analyst to identify potential errors. The task 
step in question is firstly classified into one of the HEIST behavioural categories and 
then the associated HEIST behaviour table and error identifier prompts are used to 
encourage the analyst to identify any errors that could potentially occur during 
performance of the task in question. For each credible error identified, the system 
cause or psychological error mechanism and error reduction strategy (both of which 
are provided in the HEIST behaviour tables) is recorded and the consequences 
associated with the error are described.  
 
The main differences between the approaches compared relates to the type of 
approach that they represent, the taxonomies of error modes that they use, how the 
analyst goes about predicting the errors with the technique and also what additional 
information is provided once an error has been identified. In terms of the type of HEI 
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approach, the HET, SHERPA and Human Error HAZOP approaches are examples of 
taxonomy-based HEI techniques, which are characterised by their use EEM 
taxonomies to identify potential errors. Typically EEMs are considered for each 
component step in a particular task or scenario in order to determine credible errors 
that may arise during the man-machine interaction. Taxonomic approaches to HEI are 
typically the most successful in terms of sensitivity and are also the cheapest, quickest 
and easiest to use. However, these techniques depend greatly on the judgement of the 
analyst and their reliability and validity may at times be questionable. HEIST, on the 
other hand, is an example of an error identifier prompt-based technique. These 
approaches use prompts or questions to aid the analyst in identifying potential errors. 
The prompts are typically linked to a set of error modes and reduction strategies. 
HEIST is also different in this case since it also considers performance shaping 
factors. Whilst these techniques attempt to remove the reliability problems associated 
with taxonomy-based approaches, they add considerable time to the analysis because 
each prompt must be considered.  
 
Each of the four approaches taxonomies is also distinct in that they were developed 
specifically for the method and domain in question. The HET EEM taxonomy 
contains twelve generic error modes that were collated from an analysis of civil 
aviation accidents and incidents and a review of existing HEI approaches. The 
SHERPA approach instead uses five separate EEM taxonomies linked to categories of 
human behaviour and so requires the analyst to firstly classify the task in question into 
one of these behaviours. The Human Error HAZOP approach uses so-called 
guidewords which again are different to the other methods taxonomies and are 
specific to process control. Finally, the HEIST approach again uses a different 
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taxonomy of EEM that was developed within the nuclear and chemical process 
control domain. 
 
The purpose of this study was to compare the performance of HET against three 
contemporary Human Error Identification (HEI) approaches when used to predict 
pilot errors for an approach and landing task and also to compare, in terms of error 
prediction sensitivity, the multiple methods and analysts approach with multiple 
analyst predictions for each method. 
 
Methodology 
Participants: A total of 37 Brunel undergraduate students aged between 19 and 21 
years old were used as participants in the study. Our justification for using 
undergraduate participants with no previous experience of human error identification 
and only limited experience of human factors in general stems from the original 
requirement for the methodology developed to be usable by non-human factors 
specialists during the design and certification of flight deck technology. For example, 
Marshall et al (2003) stated that “the method should also be capable of being used by 
non-human factors experts within the certification authorities” (p.6). Further, the 
capture of potential errors in the early design phases of a system require that designers 
(with limited or no human factors experience) are able to use HEI approaches. The 
participants were allocated into four groups based upon the HEI methodology that 
they used during their study (four separate error prediction studies were conducted, 
one for each HEI methodology). Group one consisted of eight male undergraduate 
students.  These participants formed the HET group and received training in the HET 
methodology. Group two consisted of nine undergraduate students. Of these six were 
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male and three were female. These participants formed the SHERPA group and 
received training in the SHERPA methodology. Group 3 consisted of a further nine 
undergraduate students.  Of these seven were male and two were female. These 
participants formed the Human Error HAZOP group and received training in the 
Human Error HAZOP methodology. The fourth and final group consisted of 11 
undergraduate students.  Of these, eight were male and three were female. These 
participants formed the HEIST group and received training in the HEIST 
methodology. All participants had no previous experience of any of the HEI 
methodologies used nor of flying an aeroplane. 
 
Flight task: The study focussed on the aircraft-landing task using ‘Land aircraft X at 
New Orleans Airport using the autoland system’ This task was part of the approach 
phase of a flight in Aircraft X (a modern, highly automated, ‘glass cockpit’, medium 
capacity airliner). This task was chosen as was deemed to be representative of a 
typical civil aviation landing task in an automated glass cockpit airliner.  A HTA was 
constructed for the flight task based on an observation of a video recording of a 
similar landing task and consultation with subject matter experts.  An extract of the 
HTA is presented in Figure 2.  
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3.  Prepare the
aircraft for landing
3.1  Check the
distance (m)
from runway
3.2 Reduce
airspeed to
190 Knots
3.3  Set flaps to
level 1
3.4 Reduce
airspeed to 150
Knots
3.7 Reduce
airspeed to
140 Knots
3.2.1Check
current airspeed
3.2.2 Dial the
‘Speed/MACH’ knob
to enter 190 on the
IAS/MACH display
3.3.1 Check
current flap setting
3.3.2 Move ‘flap’
lever to 1
3.4.1 Check
current airspeed
3.4.2 Dial the
‘Speed/MACH’ knob
to enter  150 on the
IAS/MACH display
3.6.1 Check
current flap setting
3.6.2 Move
‘flap’ lever
to 3
3.7.1 Check
current airspeed
3.7.2 Dial the
‘Speed/MACH’ knob
to enter  140 on the
IAS/MACH display
3.5 Set flaps to
level 2
3.5.1. Check
current flap setting
3.5.2 Move
flap lever to 2
3.6 Set flap to
level 3
3.8 Put
the
landing
gear down
3.10 Set flaps
to ‘full’
3.10.2
Move flap
lever to F
3.10.1 Check
current flap
setting
3.9 Check
altitude
 
Figure 2. Extract of Landing Task HTA (Source: Marshall et al, 2003). 
 
Materials 
All participants were supplied with a training package for the methodology in 
question. The training packages consisted of a description of the method in question, a 
copy of the taxonomy associated with the error prediction method; a flowchart 
showing how to conduct an analysis using the method; an example output of the 
method and also an example of an analysis carried out using the method in question. 
Participants were also given a HTA describing the action stages involved when using 
a vending machine as part of the training and also a HTA describing the action stages 
involved when landing aircraft X at New Orleans using the Auto-land system for the 
main study. The participants were also provided with photographs of all flight deck 
instrumentation used in the flight task i.e. flap lever, throttle lever, auto-pilot panel, 
Captains’ primary flight display (in the appropriate mode), landing gear lever and the 
Captain’s navigation display.  All participants were also provided with suitable pro-
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formae for recording their error predictions.  Microsoft Flight Simulator 2000™ 
Professional Edition was also used to give the participants a demonstration and 
walkthrough of the flight task under analysis. 
 
Design 
A between-subjects design was used in this study.  The independent variables were 
the four different participant groups, the HET group, HAZOP group, HEIST group 
and SHERPA groups.  The dependent variables were the errors predicted by each 
participant and time taken by each participant to conduct the HEI exercise. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited via e-mail advertisement and the respondents were divided 
into four separate groups, based upon the four HEI techniques used. For each group, 
participants were initially given a short briefing on the purpose of the experiment.  
Following this a lecture-based introduction to the areas of Human Error and HEI was 
given. Next, participants were given a short training session on the method that their 
particular group were being tested on. This included a short introduction to the 
method and a step by step walkthrough of a worked example of a HEI analysis using 
the method in question.  The analysis used for each of the methods was a HEI analysis 
of a Ford in-car radio cassette system (Stanton and Young, 1999).   
 
Once familiar with their HEI method, participants were given a HTA of a vending 
machine task (Stanton and Stevenage, 1998) along with A3 photographs of the 
vending machine and its user interface on which to undertake practice HEI analysis. 
After a demonstration of the task and a walk through of the HTA, participants used 
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their allocated method to make error predictions for the vending machine task. At this 
stage, participants were permitted to confer with other participants and also to ask the 
experimenter questions regarding the analysis.  Once the error predictions were 
complete, participants were provided with an ‘expert’ analysis (undertaken by a 
human factors researcher with considerable experience in HEI) for the vending 
machine task so that they could compare their error predictions with an experts error 
predictions for the same task. The experimenter then discussed each of the errors 
predicted and answered any questions regarding the vending machine error prediction 
task.   
 
After a short break, participants were then given the HTA for the task, ‘Land aircraft 
X at New Orleans using the Auto-land system’, as the experimental condition, along 
with colour photographs of all of the relevant flight deck equipment. After an initial 
walk through of the task, participants were given a step-by-step demonstration of the 
landing task using Microsoft Flight Simulator 2000 Professional Edition.  Participants 
were then asked to predict any potential design induced pilot errors for the flight task.  
For reliability purposes, participants returned four weeks later to carry out a repetition 
of the analysis (hereafter referred to as Trial 2) employing the same HEI technique 
that they had used during the first error prediction exercise (hereafter referred to as 
Trial 1). 
 
Data Analysis  
To compute validity statistics, the error predictions made by each participant were 
compared with actual error incidence data reported by pilots using the auto-land 
system for the flight task under analysis (which was obtained via questionnaire 
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survey). In this survey pilots type-rated on the same aircraft were asked to report any 
errors that either they had made or they had seen being made by a co-pilot, for each of 
the task steps in the HTA, ‘Land aircraft X at New Orleans airport using the Auto-
Land system’. A total of 46 pilots (45% Captains, 37% First Officers, 13.3% Trainee 
Captains, 4.7% who declined to state their position) with experience ranging from less 
than 2,000 hours to over 16,000 hours (Mean = 6, 832 hours, SD = 4, 524 hours) 
responded to the survey. 57 different error types were reported in the survey. A 
detailed description of these errors can be found in Marshall et al (2003). 
 
The sensitivity of each participant’s error predictions was calculated using the Signal 
Detection paradigm. The signal detection paradigm was used as it has been found to 
provide a useful framework for testing the power of HEI techniques and has been 
used effectively for this purpose in the past (e.g. Stanton and Stevenage, 1998, Harris 
et al, 2005). The signal detection paradigm sorts the data into the following mutually 
exclusive categories: 
1) Hit – An error predicted by the analyst that was also reported by the survey 
respondents. 
2) Miss – The Failure to predict an error that was reported by the survey respondents. 
3) False Alarm – An error predicted by the analyst but that was not reported by the 
survey respondents. 
4) Correct rejections – Correctly rejected error that was not reported by the pilots. 
This represents the number of errors contained in the HEI methods error mode 
taxonomy that were correctly rejected by the analyst and also not reported by the 
survey respondents. 
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These four categories were entered into the signal detection grid for each subject.  The 
signal detection paradigm was then used to calculate the sensitivity index (SI). This 
returns a value of between 0 and 1, the closer that SI is to 1, the more accurate the 
techniques predictions are.  The formula used to calculate SI is given in Formula 1 
(from Stanton and Stevenage, 1998) 
 
 
Si
Hit
Hit Miss
1
False Alarm
FA Correct Rejection
2
= +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + − +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
Formula 1. Sensitivity Index formula 
 
 
 
Results 
Treatment of data:  The data obtained had to first be grouped so that the multiple 
methods and analysts approach sensitivity could be calculated. For the multiple 
analyst but single method data each analyst’s error predictions using each HEI 
approach (e.g. SHERPA, HET, HAZOP, and HEIST) were pooled. For the multiple 
methods and analysts approach, six randomly selected participant’s error predictions 
from each method were pooled together. In order to be consistent in the comparison 
of the individual methods with the pool of ‘multiple methods and analysts’ some 
cases had to be discounted, as not all participants turned up to all of the sessions.  A 
core pool of six participants in each of the groups was formed, whose data was then 
used to form the ‘multiple methods and analysts’ group. The sensitivity of these error 
predictions (each method in isolation and the multiple methods and analysts approach 
data) was then assessed using the sensitivity index formula described above.  
 
 22
The mean Trial 1 and Trial 2 SI scores for multiple analysts using each method and 
also for the multiple methods and analysts approach are presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Mean SI Scores (Trial 1 & trial 2) 
 
The mean SI score results show that the multiple methods and analysts approach 
achieved the greatest mean SI scores (Trial 1 = 0.69, Trial 2 = 0.69), followed by 
multiple analysts using the HET approach (Trial 1 = 0.66, Trial 2 = 0.65). As 
sensitivity is made up of hit rate and false alarm rate, each of these was considered 
separately. The mean trial 1 and trial 2 hit rate scores for multiple analysts using each 
method and for the multiple methods and analysts approach are presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Mean Hit Rate Scores (Trial 1 & trial 2) 
 
The mean hit rate score results show that the multiple analysts using HET approach 
achieved the greatest mean hit rate scores (Trial 1 = 0.88, Trial 2 = 0.89). 
 
The mean trial 1 and trial 2 false alarm rate scores for multiple analysts using each 
method and for the multiple methods approach are presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Mean False Alarm Rate Scores (Trial 1 & trial 2). 
 
 24
The mean false alarm rate scores show that, at trial 1, the multiple analysts using 
HAZOP approach achieved the lowest false alarm rate score (0.35) whilst the multiple 
methods approach achieved the lowest false alarm rate score at trial 2 (0.34).  
 
 
Mann-Whitney ‘U’ statistical tests were performed to establish if the observed 
differences between the sensitivity index, hit rate and false alarm rate scores for the 
multiple methods and analysts and multiple analysts approaches were significant. The 
results are presented in Table 2. 
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 Table 2. Multiple Analysts versus Multiple Methods and Analysts Significance Table 
 
Signal Detection Criteria
Hit Rate Trial 1
Hit Rate Trial 2
False Alarm Rate Trial 1
False Alarm Rate Trial 2
Sensitivity Index Trial 1
Sensitivity Index Trial 2
HET HAZOP SHERPA HEIST
Multiple Analysts using
.0038
<0.005
.0101
<0.05
.0154
<0.05
.0161
<0.05
.0245
<0.05
.0247
<0.05
.0039
<0.005
.0159
<0.05
.0062
<0.01
.0163
<0.05
.0064
<0.01
.0039
<0.05
.0039
<0.005
.0039
<0.005
.0039
<0.005
.0065
<0.01
= Not Significant
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The results presented in Table 2 demonstrate that at trial 1, the multiple methods and 
analysts approach sensitivity index scores were significantly better than the multiple 
analysts scores using HAZOP, SHERPA and HEIST, but not significantly better than 
the HET multiple analyst score and at trial 2 that the multiple methods and analysts 
approach scores were significantly greater than the multiple analyst scores using 
SHERPA and HEIST, but not the multiple analyst HET and HAZOP scores. 
 
For hit rate at trial 1, the multiple methods and analysts approach score was 
significantly higher than the multiple analyst HAZOP and SHERPA analyses, but was 
not significantly greater than the multiple analyst HET and HEIST analyses. For hit 
rate trial 2, the multiple methods analysis approach score was significantly greater 
than the multiple analysts’ scores for each of the four methods. 
 
For false alarm rate, at trial 1 the statistical analysis indicates that the multiple 
methods and analysts approach scored lower (and therefore better) than the multiple 
analysts using HAZOP, SHERPA and HEIST, but that the difference between the 
multiple methods analysis and the multiple analysts using HET was not significant. 
For false alarm rate trial 2, the multiple methods and analysts analysis approach 
scores were significantly lower than multiple analysts using HET and SHERPA, but 
were not significantly lower than multiple analyst scores for HAZOP and HEIST. 
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Discussion 
Error Prediction Sensitivity 
This study had two main objectives. The first objective of the study was to compare 
the accuracy of the HET approach when used to predict design induced pilot error 
against three other contemporary HEI approaches developed in other domains. In 
conclusion, participants using the HET methodology were the most accurate in their 
predictions for the flight task under analysis, both at Trial 1 and Trial 2. This was 
most probably attributable to the fact that the HET error mode taxonomy was 
developed specifically for the use on civil flightdecks, whilst the other techniques 
were not. SHERPA, Human Error HAZOP and HEIST were developed for the nuclear 
power and process control domains. This meant that analysts were somewhat 
constrained in terms of the errors that they could predict, since the taxonomy used in 
these methods taxonomy may not have contained errors of the type that might occur 
on civil flight decks. Previous studies have also demonstrated that the HET approach 
is more accurate than HAZOP, HEIST and SHERPA when used to predict errors for 
the same flight task (Stanton, Harris, Salmon, Demagalski, Marshall, Young, Dekker 
& Waldmann, 2006). 
 
The second objective of this study was to test an approach to enhancing the accuracy 
of error predictions, the multiple methods and analysts approach. In terms of the 
overall accuracy of the error predictions, it was observed that the multiple methods 
and analysts approach was more significantly more accurate than the multiple analyst 
approach using HAZOP (at trial 1 only), SHERPA and HEIST at predicting errors for 
the flight task, but not more accurate than the error predictions offered by the multiple 
analysts using HET approach (nor HAZOP at trial 2). This finding has implications 
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for the prediction of human error in complex systems. For example, in some cases, it 
may be more appropriate to use multiple methods and multiple analysts to predict 
errors, rather than just one analyst and one method in isolation. On the basis of the 
findings derived from this study, using a group of analysts and HEI methods to 
predict error can enhance the sensitivity of error predictions, whereas using only one 
method could potentially lead to critical errors being missed during the error 
prediction process. This certainly appears to be the case when attempting to predict 
error in domains for which no HEI approaches have been specifically developed. One 
way of enhancing the sensitivity of the error predictions made would therefore be to 
use a combined toolkit of a range of HEI methods from other domains. 
 
This research lends support to Kirwan’s (1998a, b) argument for the use of a 
comprehensive multiple methods (i.e. toolkit) approach. The differences in the 
taxonomies seem to ensure greater capture of the types of error that occur on the flight 
deck. Alternatively, an error taxonomy that has been developed specifically for the 
domain in question appears to perform equally as well when multiple analysts are 
utilised. It is assumed that the superior accuracy of the multiple methods and analysts 
approach was due to the error mode taxonomy being more comprehensive as in this 
case it was effectively four error taxonomies combined. This comprehensiveness of 
the error taxonomy is likely to lead to an increase in the numbers of errors correctly 
identified (e.g. hits) and thus reduce the number of errors that are missed (e.g. 
misses). On the downside, the increased number of error modes could potentially 
increase the number of wrongly identified errors (e.g. false alarms) and decrease the 
numbers of errors correctly discarded (e.g. correct rejections). This was not the case in 
this study, however, with the multiple methods and analysts group performing better 
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in terms of SI and false alarm rate scores. Further, as pointed out earlier, in some 
circumstances (i.e. in safety critical systems analysis) it may be acceptable to generate 
a high false alarm rate if it contributes to the detection of more errors. It is 
recommended, however, that when using a multiple methods and analysts approach, 
appropriate subject matter experts with a sufficient level of experience in HEI are 
used or a combination of subject matter experts and methods experts working together 
(Stanton & Stevenage, 1998). It should be noted that the analysts in this case were 
neither experts in the domain of civil aviation nor were they experts in the application 
of HEI techniques. It would be expected that the signal detection theory statistics 
should be higher (i.e. error predictions more accurate) if this were the case. 
 
The finding that the multiple method and analysts approach was not significantly 
more accurate than the multiple analysts using HET approach indicates that a multiple 
analysts approach (using the same approach) also potentially offers a means of 
enhancing error prediction sensitivity, albeit if they are using a HEI approach that has 
been developed specifically for the domain in which the analysis is taking place. 
 
In closing, this study has demonstrated that the HET approach is a viable tool for 
identifying design induced pilot errors within the civil aviation domain. The level of 
accuracy attained by inexperienced analysts when using the HET approach to identify 
such errors is encouraging and suggests that the HET approach, when used by domain 
experts with significant experience in HEI analysis, can potentially be a very powerful 
tool for accurately identifying design induced pilot error. Further, this study seems to 
suggest that error prediction sensitivity can potentially be enhanced through the use of 
a multiple methods and analysts approach, which indicates that future HEI analyses 
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efforts should utilise teams of HEI analysts with access to a toolkit of different HEI 
approaches. 
 
It is recommended that further research into means of enhancing error prediction 
accuracy be undertaken. Also, further applications of the HET approach within the 
aviation domain are encouraged. Further, whilst this study has demonstrated that 
using multiple analysts and methods may enhance error prediction sensitivity, it is 
clear that further investigation in other domains in which error prediction is dominant 
is required, such as the process control and air traffic control domains. The usefulness 
of HEI techniques is already assured. However enhancing the accuracy of the error 
predictions offered by such techniques can only make them more powerful tools 
within system design and analysis efforts. 
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